On Being Chinese: Today (Part Two)
- andrewsingerchina
- 1 day ago
- 6 min read
“I will faithfully fulfill my responsibilities bestowed by the Constitution, with the nation’s needs as my mission and the people’s interests my yardstick.”1
China today is a reinvigorated successor to its “Hundred Schools of Thought” ancestors. Though China defies easy labeling, the melded legacy of the early Confucians and Legalists courses through Chinese society. We see this in statements such as that of Chinese leader Xi Jinping above and his overseeing of strict rule of law for the populace.
Part Two On Being Chinese discusses how the philosophical debates of the early Chinese years have translated to the China of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries, focused on governance.
The prime goals of the early years of Chinese philosophical thought for governance of person and nation remain the same more than 2,000 years later: Order. Order. Order.
The instability of the Warring States Period before 221 BCE, the collapse of Chinese power and prestige during the Nineteenth Century (the beginning of the so-called Hundred Years of Humiliation), and the travails of Maoist China in the mid-Twentieth all highlight this overarching aspiration.
Proponents of the main early schools, Confucians, Daoists, Mohists, and Legalists, each wanted this. Terms such as harmony, peace, and stability have long been common in China. They are metaphors for order. They foreshadow that the ultimate measure of good governance in China to this day is positive outcome, not process.
What is harmony in the Chinese context? According to Professor Daniel A. Bell,
“What Confucians mean by harmony, in contrast [to the West}, is a dynamic process in which diverse elements are brought into a mutually balancing and cooperatively evolving concept that involves adaptation to new situations….Harmony then refers not simply to the absence of conflict, hatred, and resentment but also to something more positive, namely a feeling of commonality and commitment among the diverse parts of the relationship.”2
China’s focus on harmonious outcomes may be the most significant point of dissonance with that of governance in America. While we object to the results of this in China when it conflicts with our ideals, and not discounting that there are those in China who are themselves not satisfied, such governance is how China has managed its enormous population and complex society for-almost-ever. I do not see it fundamentally changing.
Running China
Since the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), as China has expanded and contracted, shifted and settled, the country has been governed by a ruling system that has been on the one hand authoritarian (Legalist) and on the other hand generally guided by the ideal of virtuous and moral leadership by example (Confucian).
The ideal portion was discarded for much of the Twentieth Century by the newly-established Chinese Communist Party after it began the struggle of leading a collapsed China toward the new, self-directed, harmonious future envisioned by its founders. This was most spectacularly in evidence during Mao Zedong’s rule of China from 1949-1976 when he expressly and energetically attempted (and ultimately failed) to destroy all things Confucian and traditional in China.
Promotion of the ideal at the political level (it was never truly abandoned in the hearts of the Chinese people) has returned with a vengeance since then alongside the Legalist framework.
Rule of Law Plus
The Legalism heritage of Han Feizi seems straightforward. Under it, people are inherently bad and must be controlled strictly. By itself this would not auger well for compassionate authoritarianism. The Qin Dynasty (221-206 BCE) is generally held up as the poster child in this regard. In fact, the development of this School of Thought was initially viewed as anathema to Confucians for two related reasons. First, reliance on enacted codes and laws would supplant the higher moral calling of leadership by example. Second, the result of reason number one would be poorer governance and a risk to harmony.
One of the ancient Confucian Guodian texts notes that “it is only through a match between words and deeds that the ruler can establish trustworthiness in the people….The people might be led to avoid committing wrongs through political orders and punishments, but it is only through the education of virtue and the cultivation of ritual…that they are motivated to behave well on their own initiative.”3
China has long promoted meritocracy in governance at all levels below the hereditary top.4 Successful candidates in the Imperial Examination System filled government offices in the past. Today, China’s eventual Communist leaders work their way up the system in various technical and substantive posts around the country, first gaining many years of experience, connections, and support.
So, although authoritarian rule is a hallmark of the Xi Jinping government, at the same time, the government takes pains to stress the Confucian ideal, to promote moral and virtuous leadership. Whether this is done because it is sincerely believed or because it sounds good or both, it is well received as policy and approach because it accords with the cultural heart of the people. They want it to be true.
Nature of Man
Is the nature of man inherently good or evil? In Part One, I accepted that the choice is binary and wrote that the Confucian Xunzi saw man’s nature as evil. After exchanging emails with Professor Bell, I realize that this characterization was incorrect. There is a more nuanced middle ground, one epitomized by Xunzi that I believe is appropriate.
Xunzi wrote that we are neither necessarily good or evil, but we are “prone to self interest and the unlimited pursuit of desires,….”5 “[Xunzi] points out that man is born with desires, and necessarily seeks to satisfy his desires, yet without proper measures and standards to guide his search, inevitably there will be conflict and disorder. Ritual is just the measure to guide the proper satisfaction of desires.”6
When the Chinese government promotes the virtues, morality, and ethics of Confucian philosophy, they are seeking to tap into this. They are hoping to tamp down and shape those bad desires and self-interests in a modern context.
Corruption
Notwithstanding the Confucian ideal, corruption has long been a bane of China. The gift-giving nature of Chinese relationship culture can easily spiral out of control. Abuses of position, taking advantage, and looking out for oneself and relations to the detriment of others are examples of self-interest run amok and demonstrate lack of Confucian virtue.
Xi’s China has witnessed relentless anti-corruption campaigns since he came to power in 2012-2013. The first campaign (“Hunting Tigers and Swatting Flies”) was aimed at both high and low-level governmental offenders. Most recently, there have been large-scale purges in the Chinese military, including almost ALL of the top leadership. In a speech to military and public safety delegates at the National People’s Congress earlier this month, President Xi stated that “There must be no one in the military who harbors disloyalty to the party, and there must be no place to hide for corrupt elements.“7
These campaigns serve two goals. The first upholds the ideal of moral leadership. Government officials should be models. They should act honorably for the benefit of society in order to bring harmony and stability to China. At the same time, these campaigns enforce loyalty to the paramount leader in the survivors.
Moral leadership. Follow the law. Citizen buy-in. This is China’s continued approach to providing order in society.
Notes
1 Chinese President Xi Jinping speaking at the 14th National People’s Congress, 3.13.2023.
2 Daniel A. Bell, “Comparing Political Values in China and the West: What Can Be Learned and Why It Matters,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2017, Pages 104-105.
3 Tang Siufu, “The Guodian Confucian Texts and the Xunzi 荀子,” Chapter 16, Dao Companion to the Excavated Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts, Shirley Chan, Editor, Springer, 2019, Page 322.
4 Dynastic leadership in China has been hereditary based (family pre-20th century, CCP membership thereafter) since the end of the Hundred Schools of Thought period. Before this solidified, however, during that earlier time of philosophical debate, there was consideration by some within the early Confucian tradition of a potential alternative to hereditary rule, i.e., abdication. One pre-Qin Guodian text tells the story of the legendary sage kings Yao and Shun. “‘The way of Tang [Yao] and Yu [Shun] was to cede [their throne] instead of transferring [it to their heirs]. The regality of Yao and Shun was to benefit all-under-heaven instead of benefiting from it. To cede [a throne] instead of transferring [it to one’s heirs] is the completion of sagacity. To benefit all-under-heaven instead of benefiting from it is the perfection of humaneness.” Michael Schimmelpfennig, “How To Achieve Good Governance: Arguments in the Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道 (The Way of Tang and Yu) and the Zhong xin zhi dao 忠信之道 (The Principles of Uprightness and Reliability),” Chapter 5, Dao Companion to the Excavated Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts, Chan, Editor, Page 95.
5 Bell, “Comparing Political Values in China and the West,” Page 101.
6 Tang, “The Guodian Confucian Texts and the Xunzi 荀子,” Page 335.
Comments