The Island That Got Away (and Why It Needs to Come Home)
- andrewsingerchina
- 2 days ago
- 5 min read
The island that got away drives deep passions.
Lying tantalizingly close, less than 100 miles from the mainland, this isolated landmass has long been perched within the mainland’s sphere of influence. And yet, it remains separate, a mocking presence over the decades. Governed by a regime anathema to the mainland government, the island is labeled an existential, foreign threat. Seeking control is visceral. The mainland government enforces broad economic sanctions. Its military conducts provocative tests. Travel between the two is restricted. Multifaceted pressure is on the increase.

This is The China Chronicle, so of course, I am referring to Taiwan. However, I first wrote the opening above after reading several recent articles about the policies, statements, and actions of the American government towards Cuba since the beginning of the second Trump Administration. Though there are distinct historical, practical, and rhetorical differences, the parallels are nonetheless striking.
Why does the P.R.C. want Taiwan so badly? After all, Communist China has never ruled the island. There are both dry strategic reasons as well as heart and soul passions surrounding what China is and aspires to become.
What follows is not about the views and idealism of either America or Taiwan. It is, rather, a look at what Eric Hendriks of the Danube Institute labels “strategic empathy.” The goal is to understand “politico-cultural Others,” in this case the Chinese, in order to bring a clearer mind to the world of international relations.
STRATEGY
The strategic reasons for P.R.C. control of Taiwan are two-fold, one more manifest than the other:
Taiwan is part of the so-called First Island Chain, a line of islands running from Japan through Taiwan and into the South China Sea bordering the Philippines, Malaysian Borneo, and Vietnam. The Chain represents China’s front door into the Pacific Ocean to the east and the Malacca Strait to the southwest. China considers control of this area to be critical to safeguarding its sovereignty as well as projecting economic and military power.
Taiwan is home to the world’s preeminent semiconductor and microchip factories, chief among them TSMC. The modern world literally runs through Taiwan. If (maybe a Big if) China can take over Taiwan without destroying its infrastructure and hi-tech industry, oh what a tremendous, additional coup.
PASSION
Now, to the heart and soul.
China does not speak of conquering Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party and leading thinkers in the country speak with profound reverence of reunifying with Taiwan. They zealously defend their position that there is and has always been only one China and Taiwan is an integral part of the whole.
This land of aboriginal people was first sighted by the Portuguese and named Ilha Formosa (Beautiful Island) in the mid-sixteenth century. During the long seventeenth century, parts of the island were first colonized by the Dutch and Spanish, respectively; subsequently conquered by a former Ming general, Koxinga, fleeing the new Qing Dynasty; and finally annexed (though not fully inhabited) by the new Qing empire. Japan controlled the island from 1895-1945. The Republic of China assumed control of Taiwan at the end of World War II, and the Nationalist ROC government fled there in 1949 after the Communist Party won mainland China.
Taiwan’s history is everything and nothing in this context. Everything because it has been molded by CCP narrative with fervent flourish. Nothing because the details and the island’s past importance, or lack thereof, are irrelevant in the toolbox of greater political purpose.
The Chinese political system does not just think about Taiwan a lot. It is borderline obsessive. Reunification with Taiwan sits on a pedestal as a moral justification for continued Communist Party rule. Without reunification, China’s success is impossible. Without the Party, reunification will not happen.
Intellectuals have developed a powerful narrative supporting the political arguments. Professor Jiang Shigong, then at Peking University Law School, wrote more than twenty years ago (and republished four years ago),
“At this critical moment, mainland China must take up the heavy obligation of national reunification with utmost tenacity and will, viewing it as a fateful test of ‘heaven’s investiture of responsibility [Mencius],’ achieving national reunification with the political ambition of civilizational renewal and superior political wisdom.”1
Eric Hendriks writes of how “an entire field of legitimising narratives propagates...that the very future of humanity--global harmony itself--depends on the CPC establishing control over Taiwan….In General Secretary Xi’s words, ‘China’s development is itself the greatest contribution to the world.’’’2
This is a true believer situation. Those at the top proclaim, thinkers provide support, and the people by and large agree with the general sentiment of national unity and self-determination.3 United, China will finally escape the “Century of Humiliation” by Western imperialists. The political, intellectual, and philosophical arenas in China are aligned. This is an issue of righteousness, of justice. It is thus worth fighting over.
One risk for China (and the world) is that this idealism could jump off the millenarian cliff. Ma Jian, a Chinese writer-in-exile, captures this potential in a satirical novel criticizing China under Communism:
“During this crucial, transitional period [early twenty-first century to 2049], the ruling party of China must become the ruling party of humanity. Only then will Xi Jinping’s dream of national resurgence be realized. Only then will his China Dream go global. Only then will the Chinese people be able to go out into the world, take control and achieve the great unification of mankind….”4
Taiwan is a taut, red line in an exceptionalist world. It is one of the few areas where an opaque Chinese government has been the most direct. Government officials have messaged both through oral and written communications as well as action that America needs to stay out!
We do not have to accept China’s idealism and political imperative on Taiwan. This is not about comparing us and them. Rather, strategic empathy can help us escape being blinded by our own idealism. Strategic empathy can open our eyes to what is real for the Chinese Communist Party, the leadership of China, and ultimately the Chinese people. From their perspective, Taiwan is not a prize; it is fundamental.
Notes
1 Jiang Shigong, “The Rise of a Great Power and the Revival of Civilization: The Taiwan Issue and the ‘Enduring War of Civilization,’” originally published 2005 and republished 2022, Introduction and Translation by David Ownby, https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-on-the-taiwan-problem.html
2 Eric Hendricks, "A Study in Strategic Empathy: A Critical Exploration of Mainland Chinese Legitimisations for a Taiwan Scenario," Danube Institute, May 22, 2026, danubeinstitute.hu/en/research/a-study-in-strategic-empathy-a-critical-exploration-of-mainland-chinese-legitimisations-for-a-taiwan-scenario April 2026
3 www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-citizens-affection-for-taiwanese-may-reduce-risk-of-cross-strait-conflict/ and www.howchinaseestheworld.com/home
4 Ma Jian, China Dream, Counterpoint, Tr, Flora Drew, 2018, Page 19




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